The House of Hauser’, Part 1

Investigating the benefits of prioritizing proven impact players with clear, outlier strengths in team-building (and not chasing…

The House of Hauser’, Part 1

Investigating the benefits of prioritizing proven impact players with clear, outlier strengths in team-building (and not chasing ‘false-impact players’ from successful situations)

The hunt for franchises to create a core of role players that seamlessly fall into any lineup next to top-tier high-paid stars is constant. The 2023 free agency period saw a handful of teams chasing contenders by signing the bench reserves of Finals contestants (Bruce Brown/Gabe Vincent/Max Strus/Jeff Green signed for over 100 million dollars total).

These deals could have easily been perceived as reactive and of poor value at the time. I recall lots of justification for these deals that did not account for the fact that Green and Brown played most of their minutes with Nikola Jokic, one of the most monumental talents that basketball has ever seen, and were not particularly impressive without the assistance of the big Serbian.

Brown recorded a -7.2 net rating in 1000 minutes without Jokic, with a -7.6 net rating without Jokic or Murray. Paying a basketball parasite 22 million dollars is a poor investment, no matter the justification. Brown’s -1.9 Estimated Plus-Minus (48th percentile)/-3.1 Box Plus-Minus (172nd out of 189 qualified players) combo for the 2023–24 season validates that well enough.

Jeff Green has not been a positive force on-court for several seasons now, with a cumulative -2.8 BPM over his last three seasons in representing a player that’s firmly below replacement level.

The method will continue regardless of how ‘smart’ it is to chase non-engines of successful teams to build a roster. One of this season’s top targets for replication (or poaching) will undoubtedly be Sam Hauser of the Boston Celtics, a 6'8 26-year-old wing that most notably attempts 12 three-pointers per 100 possessions on his NBA career. This massive volume, paired with 42% career accuracy, is worth mimicking more than Jeff Green’s “veteran leadership” or the apparently intangible impact of Gabe Vincent (I see no valid reason that the Lakers paid him 33 million dollars other than him being on a Finals team and having a few outlier games).

Hauser’s value to the Celtics has shown to be relatively independent of playing with stars (though the Celtics roster construction allows him to play with many other independently good players outside of Tatum, White, or Porzingis), which is another queue to me that his value is notable (and could be treated as so by 29 other franchises).

Being large enough to play a role of substance on defense, presenting value as a rebounder, rim presence (41% rim freq/1.4 BLK%), and versatility (74 Def. Versatility score via CraftedNBA is 75th percentile) while not fouling (81st percentile in relativePersonalFouls) adds more value than most players relegated to catch/shoot opportunities.

The idea of a prospect “playing the Sam Hauser role” at the next level may seem rather basic: be a positionally tall 5th option offensively next to NBA stars, shoot 3s, and not dribble. A handful of players have had this role during the Tatum-Brown era in Boston, with none having nearly as much success as Hauser. Grant Williams, Gordon Hayward, Marcus Morris, Mike Muscala, Aaron Nesmith, and a handful of other players have all failed relative to Hauser, using Box-Plus Minus as a basic barometer.

How could his time in college have alluded to this success? Can this investigation give any tips on finding ‘the next Sam Hauser’?

Hauser went undrafted, as consensus would have stated. Sam Vecenie’s 2021 Draft Guide had him 67th, Jonathan Wasserman’s BR board had him 58th, and TheBoxAndOne’s (now Philadelphia 76ers’) Adam Spinella ranked Hauser 87th. I could not find one mention of Box Plus-Minus in any of their final draft board articles.

Seven of the current top 12 VORP returners (Murphy III, Franz, Herb, Reaves, Hauser, Alvarado, Grimes) were not in TheBoxAndOne’s top 24 prospects.

Vecenie’s summary stated Hauser would likely never be able to play defense at an NBA level but will ‘stick’ if he does. Sticking and returning top-ten Value over Replacement Player in the class after three seasons is probably not the same.

(There is value in ensuring that the leading voices in the NBA draft field are proficient at their roles and make predictive calls that age well to verify that they aren’t glorified content creators, but this is not the point of this work.)

The analysis failed to communicate that after 126 NCAA games, Hauser attempted 704 3-point attempts and converted a truly insane 43.9%. This success was not all due to him improving and raising his percentages as his career continued. After his first two seasons at Marquette, Hauser’s 3-point percentage sat at 47.3% (!!!!) on 9.5 attempts per 100 poss. For reference, the 2024 NBA leader in 3PT% is Grayson Allen, and he’s shooting 47.6% on 8.2 attempts per 100, and the 2023 leader was Luke Kennard at 49.4% on 9.9 attempts per 100. In two seasons, Hauser showed the ability to shoot the ball as well as any player on substantial volume could.

At 6'7, there is no precedence for this. Only nine high-major players over 6'4 have attempted 600 3s and converted 40% since 2012. Hauser’s 7.8 Box-Plus Minus is second only to Denzel Valentine’s 8.4, with Hauser’s offensive box plus-minus of 6.3 ranking first.

With a heightened emphasis on statistical impact, as opposed to age or nitpicking athletic traits, arguably the best tall shooter in recent NCAA history would have been valued appropriately.

The 2021 draft class saw a few players with similar profiles drafted. Moses Moody, Aaron Wiggins, and Chris Duarte all fit the general bill of tall, off-ball wing shooters and were drafted.

Duarte, only six months younger than Hauser and much less accomplished at the high-major level (due to playing his first two college seasons at JUCO Northwest Florida State College), was drafted in the lottery after two solid seasons at Oregon. His 42.4% shooting from 3 on 144 attempts in his senior season was similar to Hauser’s 41.7% on 151 attempts but did not come with the prior efficiency. Duarte’s three seasons (1 at Oregon and two @ JUCO) prior saw him shoot 37% on 395 attempts. Hauser’s first three college seasons saw him shoot a cumulative 45% on 553 attempts.

A +2 height/wingspan advantage for Hauser (and a generally more impactful college career) would indicate that he was the superior prospect. The Indiana Pacers front office thought differently, and after 2400 minutes of -3.1 BPM/-0.7 VORP basketball over two seasons from the 13th pick, Duarte returned two second-round draft picks as trade compensation with the Sacramento Kings.

Capitalizing on high-end production over multi-year samples is a primary benefit of drafting upperclassmen over unproven (sometimes unproductive) underclassmen, which makes taking a player who doesn’t return draft slot value damning. Drafting Moses Moody over Sam Hauser was less confusing, as their five-year age difference made up for the impact difference. Moody only returning the 29th-highest VORP in the class from the 14th pick is cause for other concerns, best saved for further investigations.

In the partner article to this one, I will use the same strategies of statistical player evaluation to find the most similar prospects to Hauser in the 2024 NBA Draft class. A prior understanding of how and why Hauser is a prospect archetype worth seeking out in the scouting process is necessary. It is then equally important to understand how exceptional he was over an extended pre-NBA career (where the potential for shooting attrition increased with every shot) and why perceived downsides of his game were not of a heavier weight than the outlier strengths and impact made at his size.