In the days following Atlanta’s decision to select Zaccharie Risacher #1 overall, I found myself searching for ways to rationalize a selection that directly opposed my personal approach to the 2024 draft class. I had outlined my recommendations for the prospects I saw the most value in Atlanta selecting in the Youtube video below, in the following order:

1. Alexandre Sarr
1. Ron Holland
1. Matas Buzelis

with Risacher and Donovan Clingan rounding out the top 5.

A decent amount of my Clingan skepticism was tied to the complete lack of perimeter defense on the roster1 at the time, while Risacher’s streakiness as a shooter and concerning self-creation indicators placed him in a tier that was far less desirable in my eyes than the 3 guys mentioned above.

However, pairing this decision with the subsequent trade to acquire Dyson Daniels drastically upgraded their positional versatility, size and length around Trae, which marked the 1st meaningful steps to insulate his defensive flaws since the Clint Capela acquisition. I still disagreed with the evaluation philosophy that ended up with Risacher #1 on the Hawks draft board, but the overall ethos of the roster was finally starting to make sense. This overarching idea of betting on lengthy play-finishers who can hold their own defensively certainly made rational sense from a roster construction standpoint.

Ultimately, the Hawks took an idealistic approach to the draft that theoretically should have rewarded them with a high-floor prospect that represented a coveted archetype league-wide, at least in practice.

In reality, they invested the most consequential draft capital in franchise history in a player whose shooting ability will unilaterally determine whether he’s able to return plus replacement level value, in an attempt to complement a cornerstone they traded a year and a half later, all because they prioritized the most overrated position in the league.

Zaccharie Risacher’s draft stock mirrored his three-point percentage, skyrocketing to the #1 pick across most boards when he experienced hot streaks of 3P shooting, just for consensus to cool on his stock once he hit a prolonged cold stretch. In theory, a 6’10 knockdown 3-point shooter with flashes of suffocating perimeter defense sounded amazing at the #1 pick, particularly in a class where many questioned the overall strength of the cohort. However, Risacher’s shaky shooting priors in conjunction with the inconsistency and lack of shot versatility made the 3P projection a good bit murkier than most2 were willing to admit.

In the 547 three-point attempts RealGM has logged for Risacher since 2021, he converted on 34.9% of those looks. Just 19% of his 3PA in his pre-draft season came off the dribble, casting even further doubt on the predictability of the excellent 39.4% he shot over the full season. More importantly however, he shot just 71.6% from the FT line over that same span, knocking down 217 of his 303 FTA.

Why does a player’s ability to knock down free-throws matter if we’re talking about 3-point shooting? Tobias Berger’s P.H.D dissertation, titled “Improving Managerial Decision-making Quality in the NBA Draft”, holds many gems, including some findings relevant to this question of 3P% projection. Berger discusses how 3P% stabilizes at around 750 attempts (Blackport, 2014) and that the incorporation of any evidence of “shooting touch”, namely FT% and 2P%, can help to more accurately predict 3P effectiveness, especially when sample sizes are smaller.3

In addition to the concerns we began this section with, Risacher also shot 25% on OTD 2s, 5/26 (19.2%) on Jumpers within 17 feet and finished just 54.9% of his 133 at the rim attempts. The shooting projection was, at best, average. This was such a crucial part of the evaluation since Risacher’s profile heavily suggested he would struggle to provide any creation value…

which meant he had to be a REAL shooter to offset the lack of creation, playmaking and defensive disruption while playing the wing. When it came to play types that are typically indicative of self-creation prowess, in his pre-NBA season Risacher ran 32 pick & rolls in 65 games (just 4.4% of his total plays) and managed 27 combined possessions out of iso, post-ups & handoffs. Conversely, nearly 87% of his plays came from primarily off-ball play types (Spot-Up, Transition, Offensive Boards, Off Screens and Cuts). He also struggled to mitigate TOs when asked to put the ball on the floor, with a 20% TO rate on drives, 44.8% on PNR, finishing the season with a 0.57 AST/TO ratio. As a sophomore, 93% of his scoring opportunities have come on spacing & finishing playtypes, a slight uptick from the 94% he posted as a rookie.

This intersection of a heavily assisted shot diet with little to no playmaking value on either end places Zacch in a group of players this season that no #1 pick would ever aspire to be comped to. DunksAndThree’s eWins estimates the wins a player contributes per 100 possessions over a course of the season, by extrapolating their per 100 possession impact relative to their minutes load. An average player this season has added 1.7 eWins. The average estimated wins contributed for players with at least 80% of their FGM being assisted, while assisting on less than 15% of their team’s made baskets when their on the floor AND accounting for less than 2% of their teams’ blocks and steals, is just 0.9. Zacch ranks 26th among this group, at 0.4.

A key distinction between the players in this subset who approximate above league average impact can be visualized by diving into their ancillary production, 3P volume and most importantly, 3P%. The table below is the same list of players, but with the guys who have a below average 3-point attempt rate. As a low-volume 3P shooter relative to his archetype, Risacher has struggled to even outperform 2 of the other 4 Hawks that made the original list. Kennard and Vit were both much more polished playmakers and Krejci was much more inclined to empty the clip.

This is even more apparent when we highlight the players with a below league average 3-point attempts per 75 possessions.

A quick scatter plot illustrates just how meaningful getting up 3s is for players on this archetype.

The per-possession volume is even more important than just the ratio of 3s relative to total FGA a player of this archetype takes.

The most jarring conclusion however, is how inextricably linked 3P% is with impact (eWins) among players of this archetype. Because so many of these guys are limited in the value they provide outside of their shot going in, they have to convert at absurdly high-rates from 3 on well above average volume to surpass league average impact.

Theoretically, at 6’8-6’9 in shoes, Risacher should have a larger impact defensively and on the glass than most of his low-3P volume counterparts. However, he pales in comparison on the glass to players such as Christian Braun and Jaylon Tyson and isn’t generating stops4 at the same rate as players such as Josh Green and Spencer Jones.

His oREB% is being suppressed a bit by a system that’s encouraged him to be the first outlet in semi-transition, but the lack of defensive playmaking is consistent with the 2.0 STL% and 2.0 BLK% he hovered around pre-NCAA. His transition influence IS valuable and a big part of Atlanta’s #1 ranked transition offense, but his latent impact boosting transition VOLUME has dwindled as the season has progressed, mainly because he doesn’t directly create these opportunities.

As we draw closer to that 750 career 3PA threshold that indicates stabilization, it’s becoming increasingly more likely Risacher is a 35-36% 3P shooter for the rest of his career. As we established above, he simply needs to be elite (38+%) to have a realistic path to above average impact. If this becomes reality, barring outlier development, Zacch will struggle to provide replacement level value throughout his career.

Alignment around the Cornerstone

When an organization experiences a leadership change, that’s typically followed by restructuring across the entire business. Basketball is no different. Once Onsi Saleh assumed the position as lead decision maker in the front office, it’s highly likely that the Hawks approach to this roster drastically changed. However, if there was even 1 person with an inkling of input that questioned the validity of building around Trae Young as a cornerstone, Zaccharie Risacher could not have been the pick.

Considering all of the reasons we outlined above, selecting Zacch in a context where he got to play off of Trae AND Jalen Johnson is the only way to pick him #1 considering the holes in his profile. Because the Hawks viewed him from the beginning as a complementary player5, he has only played in that role, with that minutes load for the entirety of his professional career thus far.

This has entailed only being entrusted in low-leverage minutes, with the Hawks playing just 24% of their high-leverage possessions with Zacch on the floor this season. He ranks 7th in average minutes played in the fourth quarter on the team and has logged minutes in just 7 of the 28 instances the Hawks entered “clutch minutes” this year.

Of the 700+ possessions I have manually logged in my Hawks PBP tracker, Zacch has been credited with a potential assist just 29 times. That’s a 4% “Passer Usage”6, by far the lowest of any other rotation player. His involvement in the offense has been the absolute definition of minimal. I don’t think Zacch’s role (or lack thereof) in the offense has been minimized because Quin wanted a different player, but I do wonder how the organization as a whole would’ve approached developing a different type of pick at #1.

The most substantial reports leading up to the draft linked the Hawks to 3 prospects: Zaccharie Risacher, Reed Sheppard and Donovan Clingan. If I had to guess, Quin Snyder would’ve preferred to have added Clingan. He frequently compliments opponents’ 7-footers in the pressers and adding a polished big with a clear NBA translation that boasts massive rimfluence7 on both ends is a coaches’ dream, particularly one who built his 1st NBA system around Rudy Gobert. Coaches in general will always opt for the decisions that maximize wins in the short-term8, while front offices tend to be a bit more future-facing.

For the sake of this exercise, let’s assume the Hawks went into the draft knowing they would be able to acquire Dyson Daniels. That takes Stephon Castle off the board (and likely eliminated Ron Holland as well). Selecting Reed Sheppard would’ve set off alarm bells to the rest of the league on Trae Young’s future as a Hawk, so that was likely a smokescreen. Clingan would’ve caused the positional jam with Capela9 as well. Wing has long been a position of need in Atlanta, one they had tried to fill for half a decade, rotating Cam Reddish, Dre Hunter & A.J. Griffin. It’s possible that FIT was the most prevailing reason that resulted in Zacch being selected.

I think it’s worth watching the entirety of Quin’s presser from the previous game, after the Hawks brought Zacch off the bench, fully healthy, for the 1st time in his career. It set an uncomfortable precedence, considering the label & expectations that come with the #1 pick. In one of Quin’s responses, he spoke about how Zacch’s MPG is still in line with the rest of his draft class, a statement I found curious as I try to glean just how much value Snyder and the organization put into the 2024 class as a whole. So few teams are prioritizing the development of their selections for the same likely conclusion the Hawks came to, it simply isn’t worth the effort.

This is where the conundrum lies. If a player’s outcome is tied heavily to assisted shot making, he needs to share the floor with prolific playmakers as he will struggle without that anchoring offensive presence. However, being deployed in such a manner will dampen any chance at on-ball growth, no matter how small. This is the element people miss when pointing to development trajectories of players such as Mikal Bridges, who came into the league as a pure 3&D wing, then got a usage boost in a low-leverage environment. Being platformed as a pseudo-#1 drastically lowered Mikal’s efficency, but it theoretically10 raised his creation ability once he got scaled down to a better fitting role. We’ve seen this also play out for players such as Aaron Gordon, Andre Iguodala, Jrue Holiday, P.J. Washington, etc.

This list reminds me of the players I listed in my contextualizing Risacher video:

He doesn’t possess the typical qualities or indicators of a star, lacking generational athletic gifts, measurements, outlier skills, dominant production, impact, or intangibles.

Yet somehow, he mirrors an archetype that’s coveted around the league. Look at the rosters from past champions, and you’ll see glimpses of Risacher’s high-end projection.

Derrick White. Jrue Holiday. Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. Andrew Wiggins. Donte Divencenzo. OG Anunoby. Andre Iguodala. Richard Jefferson. Harrison Barnes. Danny Green.

The list goes on and on.

Despite the variance in shape and size, these players all have a common essence, defining characteristics that make them invaluable next to franchise cornerstones and the finishing touches that complete contending rosters. They are connective 3&D guards & wings.

While a number of players listed above are much more capable of scaling up their offense, the majority of their value is produced by their ability to fluidly oscillate between roles on a night to night basis. They do whatever their team needs of them on both ends without disrupting the flow of the offense and compromising the integrity of the defense.

It’s still true that Risacher shares many of the connective skills that allowed those wings to play consequential roles on some of the best teams in the last decade and a half. The list of what he doesn’t share is longer than I initially imagined.

Wings are the “Snake Oil” of the NBA

“Well, you start by what you see and that is - he is 6’10 and got the ability to play on both sides of the ball, has the ability to defend, a versatile defender, a really good shooter, and a high IQ type of player. You know, the amount of development that he has had up until this point is fantastic, he is still only 19, he will be 19 all of next year and I have consistently said all of the important qualities for us in the past, about those types of players and who we want in the building at the end of the day and he possesses a significant amount of those..” - Landry Fields, former GM of the Atlanta Hawks after selecting Zaccharie Risacher #1 overall

There are just 3 wings that rank in the T30 in estimated plus-minus. There are about 5 or 6 wings in the T30 in 3-year RAPM. The top of the league, from an impact perspective, outside of a select few outliers11 , is reserved for guards and bigs.

I used New York’s acquisition of Mikal Bridges & OG Anunoby in the summer of 2024 as an example of:

“…just how valuable even sub-All Star level wings are to NBA teams, with Mikal Bridges commanding 4 unprotected 1sts and OG Anunoby intends to sign a five-year, $215 million dollar contract. It has become abundantly clear that if you aren’t able to identify these low-usage hyper efficient connective wings who double as capable defenders, the price to acquire them is unbelievably steep.”

But what if NBA teams are wrong to put that steep of a price on wings? Particularly those in the mold of Mikal Bridges, defensive specialists who are contact averse and middling playmakers. It took 3 games for Jose Alvarado, possession battle master, to supersede Mikal in the closing lineup and lead NY to a double-digit 4Q comeback behind his uniquely disruptive footprint in comparison to Bridges.

If the wing position is indeed a market inefficiency, the Hawks conceded to consensus when they had an opportunity to capitalize on another position. So much of the Risacher case was built upon hypotheticals, anchored by the perceived value of an archetype. However, as I outlined in the tables above, the Hawks have acquired THREE players this season since June of 2025 that mirrored his profile, and already had one on the roster. They have also brought in Jonathan Kuminga as an expiring.

The Hawks moving Zacch to the bench is what was best in the immediate for the teams’ success, but it’s also likely a precursor to their desire to explore Jonathan Kuminga’s fit with the starters as well. By benching Zacch before Kuminga is active, it may also help prevent other teams from thinking Kuminga, as a player who’s brand new to the organization, has precedent over their #1 pick.

I’m relatively comfortable saying Zacch will be a replacement level player, but that outcome puts this franchise in a precarious position entering the draft once more, with a pick that currently has the best odds at #1. All Hawks fans can hope for is that this new regime will learn from the missteps of the past and that Risacher will find his footing as the foundation of the infrastructure that was supposed to steady him, only continues to crumble further.